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The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on 
Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political Systems
Nicola Lacey* and Hanna Pickard**,1
*Departments of Law and Social Policy and Gender Institute, London School of Economics
**Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham
Abstract
The concept of proportionality has been central to the retributive revival in penal theory, and 
underlies desert theory’s normative and practical commitment to limiting punishment. Theories of 
punishment combining desert-based and consequentialist considerations also appeal to 
proportionality as a limiting condition. In this paper we argue that these claims are founded on an 
exaggerated idea of what proportionality can offer, and in particular fail properly to consider the 
institutional conditions needed to foster robust limits on the state’s power to punish. The idea that 
appeals to proportionality as an abstract ideal can help to limit punishment is, we argue, a chimera: 
what has been thought of as proportionality is not a naturally existing relationship, but a product of 
political and social construction, cultural meaning-making, and institution-building. Drawing on 
evolutionary psychology and comparative political economy, we argue that philosophers and 
social scientists need to work together to understand how the appeal of the idea of proportionality 
can best be realised through substantive institutional frameworks under particular conditions.
Recent scholarship on punishment in developed countries has been much preoccupied with 
the turn away from rationales of punishment based on its supposed rehabilitative effects, and 
with the revival of retributivism in the modernised form of ‘just deserts’ or ‘the justice 
model’. Like all forms of retributivism, desert theory purports to offer a clear criterion 
defining the fittingness of penalties by reference to a particular offence by a particular 
offender. On this theory, punishment is justified in response to, by reason of, and in 
proportion to, the offender’s desert. Desert, in turn, is premised on his or her 
blameworthiness, which is generally understood in terms of a combination of harmful or 
wrongful conduct and culpability for that conduct: crucially, the ensuing punishment must 
be proportional to or commensurate with2 that culpability, thereby curtailing any tendency 
towards injustice in the form of punitive excess. A large literature has accumulated spanning 
a number of key questions about the justice model across a number of disciplines: 
philosophical questions about the conceptual shape and normative justification of desert-
based punishment;3 legal and criminological questions about the best ways of realising the 
aspiration to deliver just deserts within legislative, sentencing and other criminal justice 
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arrangements;4 and sociological and political science questions about both the origins of the 
revival of retributivism and its effects.5
Within this last genre of scholarship, it is widely acknowledged that, in countries such as the 
UK and, particularly, the USA, the aspiration of many proponents of the retributive revival6 
to place clear limits on punishment by ensuring proportionality has not been fulfilled. 
Moreover, punitive rationales have in practice continued to be shaped by consequentialist 
considerations such as incapacitation and deterrence, with consequentialist and retributive 
considerations often blurred not only in public debate and political discourse but also in 
sentencing practice. Yet other countries that embraced the justice model, notably Sweden, 
avoided the ‘grade inflation’ in sentencing that occurred in the US and the UK.7 Views 
differ on just why this has been the case, and we are some distance from understanding the 
degree to which the turn to just deserts had any independent force alongside changing 
patterns of crime and the undoubted economic, cultural and social factors which have 
contributed to the upswing in punitiveness in many liberal market countries since the 
1970s.8
In a recent paper,9 we sketched an argument about the counter-productive implications of 
inviting ‘affective blame’ – the hostile, negative emotions such as hatred, anger, resentment, 
indignation, disgust, disapproval, contempt and scorn, which often accompany a judgment 
of ‘detached blame’ in the sense of a judgment of blameworthiness – into the sentencing and 
penal process. Drawing on a clinical model of holding patients responsible for harmful or 
wrongful behaviour without affectively blaming them, we made the case that a sentencing 
and penal process which equally sought to avoid affective blame would be entirely 
consistent with respect for an offender’s agency and responsibility for his or her offence. 
Even if a retributive rationale for punishment was accepted, we claimed, it would not follow 
that affective blame should be part of the criminal justice process, not least because there 
was reason to think that the retributive revival may have contributed to increasing 
punitiveness by legitimating hostile emotions against offenders without successfully 
institutionalising constraints on how these emotions should be expressed, acted upon and 
regulated. It follows that finding institutional mechanisms to distance affective blame is a 
key challenge for contemporary criminal justice systems; and we accordingly explored a 
number of ways in which such constraining mechanisms might be developed through 
adaptation of the protocols used to distance affective blame in the therapeutic process. Our 
paper also invited, but did not address, questions about the broader social and political 
conditions which might make the pursuit of penal responsibility without affective blame 
possible to achieve and, conversely, about the reasons why desert theory’s aspiration to limit 
punishment turned out to be hard to achieve in certain countries.
In this paper, we turn to these further questions by focusing on the issue of proportionality – 
one of the central concepts of the retributive revival, and the main idea underlying its 
normative and practical commitment to limiting punishment.10 Indeed, proportionality 
stands as the key concept in a much longer history of efforts to modernise and temper 
punishment, occupying as it does a central place in the work of Enlightenment thinkers and 
reformers across many nations: Beccaria, Bentham, Jefferson and Montesquieu.11 The 
promise of proportionality not only remains central to the appeal of desert theory, but also 
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commands allegiance from many theorists who support ‘mixed’ theories of punishment that 
combine desert-based and consequentialist considerations.12 But, as we shall argue in this 
paper, the retributive revival was founded on an exaggerated idea of what proportionality, in 
itself, could offer, and in particular failed properly to consider the question of what sorts of 
institutional conditions are needed in order to foster robust limits on the state’s power to 
punish.13 The idea that appealing to proportionality as an abstract ideal can deliver limits to 
punishment, we will argue, is a chimera: for while proportionality has a clear formal 
meaning – indicating the existence of a broad moral equivalence or comparability between 
two different phenomena such as a particular crime and a particular penalty – it only has 
substantive upshot where there is agreement about, or effective enforcement of, substantive 
criteria of equivalence or comparability. Thus, ideally, adequate limits to punishment need 
to be grounded in substantive judgements about fair and appropriate penalties which are 
meaningful to, and regarded as legitimate by, the populace in whose name they are imposed. 
The challenge, we suggest, is therefore for philosophers and social scientists to work 
together to understand the ways in which the undoubted appeal of the idea of proportionality 
– an appeal which is reflected in its currency in a wide range of prevailing social and legal 
discourses, many of them concerned with the limitation of power14 – can best be articulated 
within such a substantive framework under contemporary conditions. What has been thought 
of as proportionality, in short, is not a naturally existing relationship, but a product of 
political and social construction, cultural meaning-making, and institution-building.
The paper falls into three parts. First, we describe the emergence of neoclassical penal 
philosophy in the guise of ‘just deserts’, sketching the main causes of its resurgence and the 
main ethical and political aspirations of its supporters, before proceeding to examine the 
impact of the just deserts movement, and to evaluate its contribution to justice and humanity 
in punishment. In the second part of the paper, we review certain features of the operation of 
punishment in early modern systems, arguing that their capacity to coordinate punishment in 
such a way that it was perceived as fitting to the crime derived from a hierarchical social 
order, an association of certain forms of penal and political authority with the sacred, and the 
currency of a distinctive symbolism of equivalence. Though quite inconsistent with modern 
ideas of proportionality, particularly in the discretionary power which implied uneven 
application of penalties, we suggest that these three features of the context in which penal 
practice went forward in very different societies sheds light on how substantive criteria of 
fittingness or equivalence depend upon background social and cultural conditions. We then 
draw on this analysis to argue that the neoclassical revival of the late 20th century was 
problematic from its inception, because the metaphors of ‘desert’ and proportionality, 
particularly in certain countries, are no longer so obviously grounded in the widely shared 
symbolic systems representing agreed social norms, or in forms of political or religious 
authority, which previously animated and stabilised substantive judgments of equivalence or 
fittingness.15 Proportionality, in other words, does not have an independent effect: where it 
‘works’ to limit punishment, this is because of its articulation of, and resonance with, deeper 
conventions, normative systems, political institutions, and social structures.
In the third part of the paper, we explore what can be learnt from existing research – notably 
from the comparative political economy of punishment and from evolutionary psychology – 
about the conditions under which meaningful limits on punishment can be institutionalised 
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in contemporary polities, which are configured differently not only from early modern 
systems but also from one another. Most of the institutional mechanisms, and many of the 
evaluative ideas, which generated limits on punishment in early modern systems, lack moral 
and practical purchase under late modern conditions, particularly in liberal market countries. 
Hence, unfortunately, the revival of retributivism has all too readily translated, under certain 
conditions, into a politics of anger, affective blaming and ‘othering’ of offenders – a process 
against which appeals to proportionality have little bite, and in which retributive policies are 
in fact counter-productive to the very aims of many of the liberal supporters of the 
retributive revival.16 But we argue that much can be learnt about the conditions under which 
delineated limits on punishment command authority by examining the broader institutional 
structure of polities whose systems of punishment have indeed achieved stability. Drawing 
analogies between findings in evolutionary psychology and those in the comparative study 
of punishment about the broad conditions which foster reconciliatory as opposed to vengeful 
reactions to hostile or harmful conduct, we argue that the different impact of the just deserts 
movement – and of the ‘neoclassical’ revival of ideas of proportionality more generally – in 
countries like the US or England and Wales as compared with Nordic countries is in 
significant part to be attributed to institutional as well as cultural features of the economic 
and political system in those countries.
The structure of the argument is as follows. In the first section, we argue that the 
neoclassical claim that punishment is limited by proportionality is belied by the fact that 
recent years have shown a significant upswing in punitiveness in some but not all countries 
which adopted the ‘justice model’ amid the neoclassical revival. In the second section, we 
argue that proportionality is a chimera when appealed to in the abstract; the notion of a 
stable social sense of ‘fittingness’ of punishment to crime can be worked out only under 
very particular conditions – some of them illustrated by early modern societies, in which the 
conditions which underpinned that achievement are ones which we no longer have nor 
would we wish to have. We then show that the contemporary societies which have managed 
to sustain stable limits on punishment have done so not through appeals to proportionality as 
such, but rather through institutions and attitudes that foster reconciliatory dispositions 
between citizens, and we show that this finding is supported by a developing literature in 
evolutionary psychology about the conditions which orient people towards the choice of 
reconciliatory as opposed to retaliatory responses to hostile conduct. Irrespective of any 
appeal to proportionality, those systems which feature cultural and institutional 
arrangements which foster high ‘Associational Value’ – in other words, greater expected 
benefits of continued cooperation between individuals and groups – also foster 
reconciliatory dispositions.
THE NEO-CLASSICAL REVIVAL AND ITS EFFECTS
The articulated justification – or perhaps we should say rationalisation – of punishment in 
Western countries over the past two hundred and fifty years has followed a relatively clear, 
and widely discussed, trajectory.17 To sketch this historical story only crudely: the early 
modern retributive corporal penalties gradually gave way, from the late 18th century, as a 
‘civilising’ process issued in a preference for less overtly violent, and less publically visible, 
forms of sanctioning. By the same token, a demand arose for the highly discretionary forms 
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of power, through which early modern penalties were typically delivered, to be rationalised 
and regularised as a result of the gradual modernisation and democratisation of the 
hierarchical forms of political authority from which they emanated. Beccaria18 and 
Bentham19 are, with good reason, thought of as the key figures in this modernisation of the 
rationale of punishment, though Beccaria is of particular importance in that his work stands 
as an important modern source of both of the two main ideas which have coincided and 
competed with one another as justifications of state punishment. These are, first, the ‘neo-
classical’ argument that punishment is in some sense a morally appropriate equivalent to an 
offence, and is thus constrained by the requirement of proportionality (an argument to be 
found in pure retributive form in the work of, for example, Kant, who further saw the 
imposition of deserved punishment as obligatory rather than merely permissible); and, 
second, the utilitarian argument that punishment, as a prima facie evil, can only be justified 
by countervailing good consequences, achieved through specific or general deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, restitution or moral education (an argument most rigorously 
worked out by Bentham).
The ideas that punishment is in some deep sense retribution for a blameworthy act or an 
institutionalised expression of affective blame, and that an offender’s blameworthy conduct 
is what justifies punishment, have deep historical roots. Yet the fortunes of retributive 
theories of punishment based on culpability – blameworthiness in the sense of responsibility 
for wrongful conduct – have been mixed, particularly since the development of 
consequentialist justifications for punishment, from the writings of Cesar Beccaria and 
Jeremy Bentham to the present day. The details of this history lie well beyond the scope of 
this paper. But a brief review of the relative fortunes of retributive and consequentialist 
rationales is useful in identifying the precise misunderstandings about the concept of 
proportionality as the modern expression of the retributive ethic, and about its capacity to 
anchor punishment within clear limits, to which we want to draw attention.
Until the 18th century, what we might call a retributivism of symbolic equivalence 
dominated both the theory and practice of punishment in most of Europe. To focus on 
England as an example, a panoply of (to our eyes) harsh corporal and social penalties – 
branding, maiming, whipping, pillorying, the use of the branks or ‘scold’s bridle’ and, 
ultimately, capital punishment – were deemed equivalent to the relevant offence, and 
inflicted in public, hence reinforcing spectators’ apprehension of that equivalence. In a pre-
democratic world, the moral logic of the lex talionis – ‘an eye for an eye …’ – appears to 
have struck a deep chord, not least because of the resonance between penal authority and 
various Christian doctrines. Indeed the idea that penalties should be measured and 
proportionate finds its origins in the ecclesiastical law practice of imposing graduated 
fines20 – a practice in stark contrast to princely, secular early modern penalties, in which the 
monarch’s power to punish or to pardon through an exercise of ‘grace’ was the antithesis of 
the classical aspiration to mete out even-handedly a ‘just measure of pain’.21
A robust form of retributivism – the idea that the application of a deserved penalty is, a 
priori, a self-evident good barely requiring justification, indeed something which is morally 
required – appears not to have posed significant problems of legitimation. It is only from the 
middle of the 18th century that this self-evidence of punishment seems to have been under 
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challenge. This was for a number of reasons. They include the emergence of more 
egalitarian and democratic ideas in Europe and North America; the growth of sentiments 
opposed to the public display of violence; and the growing regulatory ambitions of a more 
organised state. For both moral and prudential reasons, the banal violence of the early 
modern penalties began to be questioned, and the seeds of a reformed penal system, focused 
not only on doing justice but also on disciplining the subjects of punishment in a more 
systematic way, notably through the modernisation and expansion of the prison, were 
planted.22 But the declining self-evidence of the ancien régime in punishment may, 
ironically, also have had to do with the attempted rationalisation and modernisation of 
retributivism which Beccaria’s (and Kant’s) philosophy exemplified, with the growing 
acceptance that punishment required abstract moral justification itself a reaction to the 
declining force of early modern symbols of equivalence largely expressed through physical 
punishments. In particular, the recognition that desert is calibrated not only with the 
offender’s misconduct or manifested bad character but, importantly and additionally, with 
the degree of the offender’s responsibility, disrupted any simple symbolism of equivalence.
This was not, of course, in the nature of a clean break from retributivism to utilitarianism; in 
particular, religious overtones to punishment as a form of atonement persisted. The modern 
prison was, after all, constructed as a ‘penitentiary’, and early prison regimes were strongly 
focused on encouraging the offender to reflect on his or her wrongdoing and come to a state 
of repentance – an idea which it was possible to bring into conformity with the utilitarian 
goals of discipline and reformation which were becoming so influential.23 Conversely, many 
pre-modern penalties – branding and whipping for example – must surely have had 
incapacitative and deterrent rationales and effects alongside their retributive foundations. 
But as the 19th century wore on, the moral project of modern imprisonment became 
increasingly tied up with the calculation of its consequences: initially with more discourses 
focused on deterrence; then on identifying, through social Darwinist ideas and, ultimately, 
Lombrosian criminology, certain ‘types’ in need of moral re-education or incapacitation; 
and, into the 20th century, with a welfarist philosophy applied to the rehabilitation of 
offenders.24
The first two thirds of the 20th century have been, aptly, characterised in Garland’s 
influential work as a period in which punishment in most advanced democracies was 
increasingly constructed in welfarist terms.25 While punishment was certainly viewed as an 
appropriate state reaction to wrongdoing, and the panoply of responses deployed by most 
democratic societies included a range of severe sanctions, often including capital 
punishment, the infliction of hard treatment was tempered by a distinctively welfarist or 
ameliorative spirit. Probation and the development of various forms of training for young 
offenders were early signs of this penal welfarism. And after the Second World War, 
particularly in countries like Britain and the United States, a distinctive form of penal 
welfarism – widely known as the rehabilitative ideal – established itself as a central rationale 
for state punishment. Punishment was justified by appeal to its potentially rehabilitative 
consequences; and the variety of ameliorative and even therapeutic programmes and 
‘treatments’ burgeoned.26
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The penal practices and articulated penal policies and principles of national governments, of 
course, typically exhibit a mixture of potentially philosophically incompatible elements such 
as general and special deterrence, incapacitation, reform, denunciation, reprobation and 
retribution. So one should not exaggerate the completeness with which a welfarist or 
rehabilitative ethic prevailed across penal practices of the countries which followed the 
welfarist path. But it did, undoubtedly, enjoy a period of dominance; and, just as clearly, its 
influence declined as a result of a decisive change in public penal philosophy from the 1970s 
on. As recently as 1968, H. L. A. Hart, in his postscript to Punishment and Responsibility,27 
reflected something approaching a liberal consensus when he remarked that ‘Few people 
would now advocate so thoroughgoing a variety of retribution as the pure retributive view 
which regards the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done [as] itself just or 
morally good’,28 let alone the further Kantian view that such punishment is not merely 
morally permissible but morally obligatory.29 While Hart accorded some respect to the 
argument that the value of punishment consists in ‘the authoritative expression … of moral 
condemnation for the moral wickedness involved in the offence’ – an institutionalised 
communication of resentment – the idea that returning suffering for evil is intrinsically good 
is regarded as ‘a mysterious piece of moral alchemy’ or ‘a primitive confusion’ between 
punishment and compensation.30 The prevailing sense of Hart’s book is a confident liberal 
consensus that while consequentialist approaches to punishment could be abused and subject 
to excesses, and that adequate limits on the distribution and quantum of punishment were a 
key concern, pure retributivism was a thing of the past. Yet a mere 20 years after the 
publication of Hart’s influential collection, the retributive tradition, repackaged as the ‘just 
deserts movement’ or the ‘justice model’, had captured the imagination of both policy 
makers and penal philosophers in the USA, the United Kingdom and many other countries. 
How did this happen?
The reasons for the demise of the rehabilitative ideal are well known,31 and we will not 
rehearse them in any detail here. Two important concerns were uppermost. First, the 
rehabilitative ideal led to a rise in lengthy indeterminate sentences based on predictions of 
‘dangerousness’ or need for treatment, and implied broad and unaccountable official 
discretion as to release date, based on expert judgments about prognosis, risk and ‘cure’. 
Alongside this concern with executive discretion sat a civil libertarian concern about the 
capacity of indeterminate sentencing to violate offenders’ rights. The concern to establish 
respect for agency and responsibility as core values of the criminal process was not, of 
course, restricted to proponents of ‘just deserts’,32 it also characterised theories which seek 
to combine backward-looking and forward-looking considerations in the justification of 
punishment.33 But the justice model successfully presented itself as the approach best able 
to generate an account of punishment compatible with both full respect for offenders as 
agents and the modern ambition to achieve even-handedness, constrained discretion and – 
most important to our argument in this paper – limits on state punishment.
The limiting principles celebrated by the justice model are underpinned by the further claim 
that a certain proportionality can be built in to the quantum of punishment; and that this in 
turn is guaranteed by the backward-looking orientation of punishment’s justification. The 
idea that punishment is conditioned on, and responds to, blameworthiness implies that the 
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punishment must be proportionate to it. It was therefore widely assumed – and hoped – that 
the proportionality implied by desert would provide clear limits on punishment. By linking 
not only the justification but the distribution and quantum of punishment to the offender’s 
desert, in the sense of the level of blameworthiness appropriately to be attached to the 
offence, the justice model appeared to offer a clear limit on the extent of the state’s right to 
punish, and presented itself as a progressive, humane and liberal approach.
This aspiration is, however, very far from having been universally realised in practice. 
Thirty years on, the practical impact of the justice model presents a mixed picture, and in 
liberal market countries such as England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, New Zealand and – 
most spectacularly – the United States, the scale of punishment has increased relentlessly. 
This penal ‘grade inflation’ has a number of different dimensions, of which we here mention 
only the most obvious. The imprisonment rate per hundred thousand of the population has 
soared, as a result of both increasing flows of defendants through the criminal courts and a 
rise in sentence levels, particularly for certain categories of offence.34 Mandatory sentencing 
systems have become a common feature of these liberal market systems, and many of the 
sentencing guideline systems designed to foster the determinacy sought by the justice 
model35 in fact led to longer sentences as a result of the political choice to structure them 
around very high tariff scales, and to reduce judicial discretion to temper sentence 
severity.36 In addition, prison conditions in many of these countries have deteriorated, with 
not only overcrowding but also deliberately punitive and restrictive regimes ousting 
longstanding ameliorative programmes focused on education, vocational training, drug and 
alcohol treatment, and therapeutic interventions.37 Finally, stigmatising post-sentence 
conditions and disqualifications, which are inimical to reintegration, such as 
disenfranchisement, placement on offender registers, and ineligibility for certain jobs and 
public benefits, have been, particularly in the United States, on the rise.38
Furthermore, a number of countries in which the justice model had the most decisive 
influence on policy – notably the United States and England and Wales – have also seen a 
continuation or even acceleration of practices, such as indeterminate sentencing and 
preventive justice, which were thought to express the more extreme injustices and disrespect 
for the rights and agency of the offender that characterised the rehabilitative ideal, in 
principle and in practice.39 It turns out, as Jeffrie Murphy has put it, that retributivism has 
two faces: one oriented to justice and respect for responsible agency; the other oriented to 
vengeance and to moral emotions such as resentment, anger and other hostile, negative 
attitudes typical of affective blame, which when allowed to issue in what Murphy calls ‘deep 
character’ retributivism can easily rationalise severe and ‘othering’ penalties.40 And appeals 
to ‘proportionality’ have little limiting potential here, for while empirical studies indicate a 
noteworthy degree of consensus, even across different countries, on the relative seriousness 
of standard offences – so-called ‘ordinal proportionality’41 – they reveal no such consensus 
about what this implies in terms of what penalty is suitable – ‘cardinal proportionality’.42 In 
‘core’ areas of criminal law, appeals to ordinal proportionality may therefore provide some 
basis for institutional arrangements such as sentencing guidelines;43 and indeed the various 
programmes of sentencing reform launched in many jurisdictions in the wake of the just 
deserts movement provide plentiful examples of successful institutionalisation of stable 
relativities between penalties. But the lack of any comparable consensus about cardinal 
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proportionality implies that appeals to proportionality are, under current conditions, unlikely 
to be a successful basis for institutionalising substantive criteria of a punishment’s ‘fitness’ – 
hence, as we argue, rendering the appeal to proportionality chimerical as a basis for limiting 
punishment. In the light of this difficulty, it is therefore not surprising that many desert 
theorists have focused primarily on ordinal rather than cardinal proportionality. But the very 
idea that a certain punishment is deserved – and with it, the whole basis for proportionality’s 
purported capacity to set upper limits on, or to generate substantial criteria of fittingness of, 
punishment – rests on cardinal rather than ordinal proportionality.
Strikingly, in other countries which also moved towards sentencing guidelines and a range 
of institutional arrangements counselled by the justice model’s version of neoclassical 
retributivism, which emphasises the importance of responsible agency – notably Sweden 
and the other Nordic countries44 – the increase in the scale and intensity of punishment has 
been less marked. Clearly, both trends in crime and in public concern about crime, as well as 
distinct penological traditions and sentencing institutions,45 are at issue here. But the very 
different impact of the justice model in different countries raises important questions about 
the cultural, political, social and institutional conditions under which the retributive revival 
invites an escalation of insatiable affective blame, and those under which it fosters – or can 
be made consistent with – determinacy and moderation in punishment. It raises questions, in 
short, about the cultural and institutional arrangements which can make the metaphor of 
proportionality meaningful, and punishment accordingly limited in real terms.
FIXING PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MODERN SYSTEMS: SYMBOLIC 
EQUIVALENCE, STATUS HIERARCHY AND THE SACRED
In addressing these questions, a useful place to start is by looking at certain features of the 
penal systems which predated the modern push towards consequentialism in punishment, or 
which continue to exist in parts of the world whose penal practices were less decisively 
affected by the processes of modernisation and democratisation which swept Europe and the 
United States in the 18th and 19th centuries. In many of their earlier forms, retributive ideas 
related to wider frameworks of social and ethical meaning which underpinned prevailing 
social and political systems and institutional practices – an environment which had 
fundamentally changed by the time attempts were made, in the 1970s, to revive and realise 
retributive ideas. An effort to understand the nature of the lost cosmology which leant 
meaning to early modern punishments – impressionistic as it must be within the confines of 
a single paper – may, we suggest, help to explain such capacity as they enjoyed to 
institutionalise a practice of retributive punishments within clear limits, the very ‘distance’ 
of the examples helping us to think more imaginatively about how the legitimation of penal 
practices is shaped by prevailing interests, institutions and ideas.
Both the historical and the conceptual foundations of retributivism are generally associated 
with the lex talionis. Taking this as our core example therefore – while bearing in mind the 
analogies with other systems such as the corporal penalties typical of the early modern 
criminal justice systems of Europe and the system of penalties prescribed by sharia law – 
we would suggest that early systems of retributivism had at least three distinctive features 
key to their legitimation and stability. The first was a social ontology of status hierarchy 
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which rendered the legitimation of punishment a far less pressing issue than it is in liberal 
societies which place a high value on individual autonomy,46 and which prescribed different 
forms of penalty calibrated with social class and oriented to widely understood marks of 
degradation.47 The second was a vision of penal authority tied to the sacred. This was 
manifested in either religious doctrines of damnation, expiation, atonement, penitence and 
so on, or a vision of political authority marked by symbols of supra-human or highly 
particular human authority such as the ‘divinity’ or ‘majesty’, implying the princely power 
not only to punish but to pardon through the exercise of ‘grace’.48 The third was what we 
will call a shared symbolism of equivalence. Of course, few systems have attempted to enact 
literally the symbols of cardinal proportionality contained in the lex talionis. But the fact is 
that, to contemporaries, prescribed punishments in many early modern systems related in 
some intuitively meaningful way to the wrong done (and typically did so independently of 
any psychological judgments of responsibility which complicate assessment of culpability in 
modern desert theory, and which emerge alongside modern, psychological conceptions of 
selfhood).49 Each of these conditions made it possible to coordinate the expectations of the 
relevant actors so that they were in agreement on not only the need for a penal response, but 
equally the appropriate shape which that response might take. If we look back to the early 
modern English penalties which seem so cruel, horrifying and indeed disproportionate 
today, we can nonetheless acknowledge that they found their form, and took their place, 
within a composite view of political authority which itself drew on symbols, doctrines and 
common values, as well as being stabilised by a rigid status hierarchy and an authoritarian 
system of governance – conditions which also applied, of course, to the church, whose 
panoply of graduated fines represents a fascinating precursor to modern conceptions of 
proportionality.50 This was, of course, by our standards an unduly hierarchical and 
undemocratic world; and the rituals which elaborated different forms of capital penalty, as 
well as the different forms of corporal penalty such as branding, pillorying and so on, strike 
us, for good reason, as deeply inhumane. Moreover the idea of punishment before the public 
gaze – a key condition for the diffusion of shared perceptions of symbolic equivalence – is 
now regarded as fundamentally uncivilised.51 But it is worth remembering that the world 
view from which these penal practices proceeded was one in which the symbols of state and 
penal authority formed part of a broader cosmology of authority and right, itself often bound 
up with claims about divine or traditional legitimation, and one which commanded respect 
well beyond the elite.
Consider, for instance, the widespread popular participation in the drama of the scaffold – 
not only as crowds witnessing executions,52 but as consumers of many forms of popular 
culture. These include the criminal autobiographies which, in the form of Defoe’s Moll 
Flanders,53 finally transmuted into an early form of the realist novel;54 the Newgate 
Ordinary’s widely read reports on the spiritual condition and conduct of the condemned in 
the run-up to execution; and the street ballads and pamphlets which were preoccupied with 
not only the drama of justice being done but also the condemned offender’s reception of the 
punishment. Often – and, within this literary genre, ideally – such reception included 
scaffold speeches that consisted of confession and penitence, transforming execution into a 
potential scene of redemption within Christian cosmology. Indeed, many historians’ 
accounts of the behaviour of the scaffold crowd and of the choreography of the procession 
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and execution process suggest that the offender’s confession was key to the successful 
enactment of what amounted to a highly ritualised – and cathartic – form of drama.55 
Despite the hierarchical authority and power with which punishment was meted out, all the 
participants had a part to play in the script.56
The vision of legitimate power and authority which underpinned the early modern English 
penal system did not, of course, consist only or even primarily in Christian doctrines: here as 
in other early (and some existing) systems, social codes of honour and status were also 
important.57 But there can be little doubt that this world of widely shared deference to 
authority, and vision of authority as vested with, broadly, sacred significance – think, for 
example, of the conception of ‘majesty’ – made a certain sense of penal practices, 
constituting penality as one among many social rituals in which that hierarchical authority 
was enacted. Within this system of meaning and the prevailing cultural, moral and political 
economy, as Douglas Hay has persuasively argued,58 prerogatives such as pardoning and 
mercy, highly discretionary and unevenly applied though they were, made sense. But, as the 
source and form of political authority has been subject to a process of systematisation and 
rationalisation in the construction of the modern nation state, older forms of ordering and of 
meaning-making have been eroded.59
Equally important, the symbolism of equivalence which underpins the lex talionis, sharia 
justice, or the corporal and capital penalties perhaps most vividly exemplified by Foucault’s 
famous portrayal of the execution of the regicide Damiens in the opening pages of 
Discipline and Punish60 have, for the majority of those living in Western countries, lost their 
persuasive appeal. But to contemporaries, not only the complex dramaturgy represented by 
spectacular penalties such as that of Damiens, but more routine corporal penalties such as 
maiming and branding, related in some intuitively meaningful way to the wrong done.
The effort to build a modern equivalent to the lex talionis has long taken the form of appeals 
to proportionality. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson’s 1778 Bill for Proportioning Crimes and 
Punishments in the early formation of the United States combines the appeal to 
proportionality with a continuing commitment to talionic punishments to a striking degree:
Whosoever on purpose and of malice forethought shall maim another, or shall 
disfigure him, by cutting out or disabling the tongue, slitting or cutting off a nose, 
lip or ear, branding, or otherwise, shall be maimed or disfigured in like sort: or if 
that cannot be for want of the same part, then as nearly as may be in some other 
part of at least equal value and estimation in the opinion of a jury …61
In the neoclassical revival of the late 20th century, the appeal to proportionality tended to be 
realised rather in the technical form of procedural mechanisms such as sentencing guideline 
systems. But the stark fact is that those systems produce staggeringly different judgments of 
what counts as a ‘proportional’ penalty for, say, theft, rape or manslaughter, in countries 
such as Sweden on the one hand and the USA on the other – countries which, for all their 
differences, share many features of political and social culture and economic development. 
Moreover there are significant differences between what is now considered proportionate 
within particular countries as compared with 40 years ago – as exemplified by the 
emergence of mandatory sentencing in many jurisdictions, notably the United States and 
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England and Wales.62 We now live in a world which has largely moved away from 
attachment to physical symbols of penal equivalence, from the established markers of status 
hierarchy which underpinned deference to established political authority as such, and from a 
view of political authority as invested with sacred power – all features which contributed to 
the stabilisation of criteria of ‘fitting’ punishment.63 The modern answer to the 
(unappealing) pre-modern equilibrium is an appeal to proportionality. But such an appeal 
can in itself contribute little to the construction of norms adequate to limit state punishment. 
Indeed, proportionality represents an intuitively shared starting point precisely because it is 
virtually indeterminate in its substantive implications: in other words, it simply defers the 
crucial and complicated processes of meaning-making, consensus-building and institutional 
development.
THE CONDITIONS OF ‘PROPORTIONALITY’ IN LATE MODERN SYSTEMS
To modern readers, the suggestion that there is anything to be learnt of relevance to penal 
reform today from early modern penal systems, let alone that such systems were better able 
to fix conventional values on punishment which were in some sense ‘proportionate’ or 
‘equivalent’ in the way we think of these requirements today, may seem outlandish. Our 
implicit self-understanding, in both our penal thinking and our political thinking, is that the 
last three centuries have been, albeit with horrifying setbacks, an era of progress and of 
increasing civilisation, not least in our practices of punishment. That progress is associated 
with a recasting of what we might call the cosmologies, or systems of symbolic meaning, 
which animated and legitimised older practices of punishment and state authority, as 
atavistic, pre-modern, part of the ancien régime. In the process of modernisation, those 
symbolic systems were either fully rejected as irrational or uncivilised, or demoted in 
political importance. But if they were indeed important in calibrating, legitimising and 
stabilising punishment, efforts at penal reform may have been hindered by a failure to 
appreciate their role or to acknowledge the impossibility of reviving them by an act of 
political will. The neoclassical aspiration was to create modern mechanisms for fixing 
cardinal as well as ordinal proportionality; but the impact as well as the shape of such 
mechanisms has varied decisively even among otherwise comparable countries. This raises 
questions about the implications of the value pluralism and heterogeneity typical of 
individualistic and secularised western democracies, and particularly in the competitive 
political systems of the liberal market economies such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, for our efforts to garner consensus about appropriate limits on punishment 
under contemporary conditions.
A useful goal is therefore to work towards an understanding of the institutional conditions 
and broader social arrangements under which a successful orientation to limited punishment 
and to reconciliation may be stabilised. In this section we begin this task, arguing that this 
capacity is greatest where – by broad analogy with early modern systems – appeals to 
proportionality connect with a larger shared frame of common meaning and consensus about 
legitimate authority;64 and where they take place within a social and institutional context in 
which the relevant actors share expectations of both interdependence and the ability of social 
norms and institutions to coordinate effective cooperation between them in the medium to 
long term.65 This thesis is based on two very different fields of research. First it draws on 
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work in evolutionary psychology which explores the significance of two contrasting 
standard responses to exploitative behaviour: vengeance and reconciliation; and which 
draws a clear distinction between the evaluation of the level of seriousness of offence and 
the choice of response. As we shall argue below, this research has some interesting 
implications for our efforts to understand why some modern social orders seem better able 
to institutionalise moderation in punishment than do others. Second, our thesis draws on 
several paradigms in comparative political economy which have developed models of 
distinctive social, economic and political systems with differential capacities to coordinate 
behaviour, motivate consensus, and be guided by an orientation to long term relationships 
between members. Focusing on the implications of these literatures in evolutionary 
psychology and in the comparative political economy of varieties of capitalism, political 
systems and welfare regimes, we aim to produce an analysis of the political, social and 
institutional conditions which are most likely to stabilise and moderate the conventions of 
proportionality in punishment.
Literature in evolutionary psychology (as well as in game theory) has explored the ways in 
which group members react to hostile conduct and how these impact on relationships and 
group dynamics.66 Two basic responses to hostile conduct exist: retaliatory and 
reconciliatory. Retaliatory responses aim to reduce motivation to exploit others by imposing 
a cost and thereby adjusting the expected benefit of any hostile conduct for the aggressor in 
future. Reconciliatory responses, in contrast, aim to reduce motivation to exploit others by 
seeking to restore cooperative relationships, thereby preserving the possibility of mutually 
beneficial interactions between group members in future. Both responses thus aim to protect 
against future exploitation, but also carry risks. Retaliatory responses risk escalating 
aggression and threatening the fabric of on-going relationships. Retaliation protects against 
future exploitation only in so far as the aggressor fears getting caught and so being subjected 
to retaliation: it fosters no intrinsic desire to end hostilities in the aggressor; indeed, it may 
undermine any such desire and hence increase aggression. The success of retaliation as a 
response therefore depends on adequate monitoring of the aggressor and possession of the 
power to effectively harm them in turn. Reconciliatory responses demand a willingness to 
forgive the aggressor and wipe the slate clean for the sake of future mutually beneficial 
relations. Reconciliation aims to foster an intrinsic desire in the aggressor to end hostilities 
by eliciting remorse and recognition of the value of the relationship. It therefore does not 
depend on monitoring and power. Reconciliatory responses do however risk leaving the 
forgiving party vulnerable to future exploitation, if the aggressor deceives them about their 
commitment to avoid hostilities and maintain good relations. Nonetheless, from the long-
term perspective, reconciliatory responses are optimal when successful, for they reduce the 
risk of the aggressor perpetrating harm without incurring the cost of monitoring and the 
maintenance of coercive power in the future, while bringing the benefit of maintaining 
relationships so far as possible.
Conditions that foster both the likelihood and the viability of adopting a reconciliatory 
response include: being in a kin relationship; recognition of the aggressor’s work or other 
social productivity; the aggressor’s remorse or repentance; and the mutual dependence in 
various forms of the aggressor and other members of the group. Within evolutionary 
psychology, these conditions are understood as pertaining in one way or another to 
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perception of the aggressor’s ‘Associational Value’: in other words, the value which can be 
expected to derive from future interactions with them. Where Associational Value is high, 
the orientation to forgiveness and reconciliation is accordingly enhanced; where it is low, 
either because of features of the aggressor themselves or the relationship they have with 
members of the group – or, as we shall suggest below, features of the socio-political 
environment – the orientation to retaliation will be stronger. Evaluations of how to react to a 
hostile act, holding evaluations of its seriousness constant, are accordingly shaped by 
Associational Value: by the expected value of future interactions with the offender.67
This research resonates with an extensive literature in comparative political economy. The 
Associational Value findings suggest that countries with higher levels of social solidarity 
and trust will be those in which it is easiest to create institutions and practices oriented 
towards reconciliation and hence to moderate retributive excess; and that it may be harder to 
generate barriers to retaliation and escalating aggression, and incentives to reconciliation, in 
large scale, anonymous, urbanised societies, where confident evaluations of high future 
Associational Value are harder to make. Indeed, comparative sociological evidence supports 
this suggestion, in that the countries which have experienced the most dramatic increase in 
punitiveness over the last 40 years are those with the lowest levels of solidarity and trust and 
the highest levels of heterogeneity along a range of social indicators.68 More systematically, 
there may well be important social and institutional differences which structure the 
incentives and capabilities towards retaliatory versus reconciliatory reactions to crime. And 
it is here, we would argue, that evolutionary psychology research resonates with three 
related models in comparative political economy: Hall and Soskice’s characterisation of 
‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ ‘varieties of capitalism’;69 Esping-Andersen’s characterisation of 
‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’;70 and Lijphart’s characterisation of competitive versus 
consensus-oriented political systems.71 Although a full and detailed exploration of these 
resonances is beyond the scope of a single paper, the main points of connection may readily 
be sketched.
As we have seen, the notion of proportionality generates in itself no concrete limits to 
punishment; hence the question of how much – and indeed how – to punish remains open to 
the sway of convention, political decision, or expediency.72 Prevailing conventions; the 
institutional structures within which they develop, and within which penal policy is 
formulated; and the quality and intensity of social relationships, themselves premised in part 
on conventions and institutional structures, accordingly become crucial to the construction 
of meaningful limits on punishment. Liberal market countries, which have in recent years 
moved to increasingly flexibilised economies, do not invest heavily in their members’ skills. 
In these countries, labour market conditions typically produce a high proportion of short-
term and insecure jobs and, significantly for our argument, their heavy reliance on 
monitoring to secure compliance is reflected in strikingly high levels of ‘guard labour’.73 
The conditions for establishing high future Associational Value – and for evaluating it with 
any confidence – would therefore seem to be weaker in liberal market economies than in 
coordinated market countries. For coordinated economies’ comparative advantage is built on 
long term investment in their members’ skills, an investment itself premised on the 
expectation of long term relationships of cooperation and mutual dependence between 
different groups. And these relationships help to foster intrinsic motivations for compliance 
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with prevailing social norms (at least among insiders – an important caveat when it comes to 
penal policy).74
The coordinated market economies, moreover, typically feature the more generous welfare 
systems which, particularly in their Nordic, social democratic form, represent a recognition 
of mutual interdependence and belonging and express a culture of solidarity which fosters 
trust relations (and which is strongly correlated, as shown by comparative research, with 
lower levels of punishment).75 These welfare systems, one might say, represent an 
institutionalisation of the collective expectation that Associational Value between citizens 
will – and indeed ought to – be high and widespread. Moreover, we might expect 
Associational Value to be weaker – and hence the appeal to proportionality (or other 
metaphors aspiring to limit punishment) a less effective constraint on retributive reactions – 
in the countries with highly competitive, first-past-the-post political systems, where policy 
horizons tend to be relatively short term and policy platforms accordingly volatile, than in 
the consensus-oriented political systems typical of the northern European and Nordic 
countries. For, in the latter countries, policy horizons tend to be longer term as interests 
within a proportionally representative system have to be bargained out in the process of 
coalition-formation: voters can accordingly have some confidence in the credibility of the 
policy platforms on which parties stand for office.76 It follows that these political systems 
not only depend on, and set up incentives encouraging actors to, compromise, but also foster 
the sort of stability and group cohesion which underpins greater expected Associational 
Value. Their capacity to limit punishment, in short, is dependent not on abstract appeals to 
proportionality but on social and political cohesion which fosters high Associational Value 
between citizens and hence an orientation towards reconciliation – conditions which are met 
to a greater degree in the coordinated systems of northern Europe and the Nordic countries 
than in the Anglo-Saxon, liberal market countries.77
In other words, the psychological conditions which foster an orientation to reconciliation, 
through sustaining dense networks of mutual Associational Value, are better institutionally 
supported in coordinated market economies whose production regimes are premised on 
investment in long term relationships; in proportionally representative, consensus-oriented 
political systems in which there is a longer time frame for policy making; and in social 
democratic welfare systems which symbolise mutual dependency and which foster solidarity 
and relatively low levels of social inequality. To put this explicitly in terms of the 
Associational Value model set out above, a well coordinated labour market within a society 
in which mutual dependency and solidarity are also reflected in generous welfare state 
arrangements supports recognition of an aggressor’s work or other social productivity and 
expresses, at the level of the polity, an analogue of kinship relationships at the interpersonal 
level; the proportional political representation of all sectors creates both mutual dependency 
and stability which enhances expected Associational Value; and mutual dependence and a 
prevalence of long term relationships within both economic and social relations prima facie 
seems likely to enhance the scope for both expectation of and effective communication of 
remorse or repentance, so as to preserve those relationships. The perfect conditions for 
forgiveness and reconciliation, like Durkheim’s ideal ‘conscience collective’, exist 
nowhere.78 But the institutional structure of different societies has a decisive impact on the 
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extent to which they can be constructed, by affecting the opportunities and incentives of key 
actors such as judges, prosecutors, police officers, victims of crime – and indeed all of us 
who vote on criminal justice policy. The importance of trying to understand the nature of 
this institutional impact can hardly be exaggerated.
The question of what shapes the balance between retaliation and reconciliation has long 
been recognised by sociologists, anthropologists and criminologists as a crucial question 
about punishment. Even those who, like G. H. Mead, see desert as the basic reason for 
punishment, and the expression of vengeance and affective blame as socially useful, 
acknowledge that these generate no stable criteria for the level of punishment, and so 
inevitably carry the risks of the escalation of aggression and of the stigmatisation of 
offenders. As Mead put it: ‘We see society almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude 
it has taken towards those who break its laws and contravene its institutions’;79 and, in a 
passage reminiscent of Durkheim; ‘hence … the attitude of hostility, either against the 
transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the group a sense of 
solidarity … which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid for this 
solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous.’80 In the sway of these powerful 
emotional dynamics – recently seen perhaps most vividly, among advanced democracies, in 
the United States – appeals to proportionality are little more than empty rhetoric. What is 
needed, rather, is an understanding of the institutional conditions which can structure the 
dynamics of collective action so as to inhibit the slide into stigmatisation and othering, and 
foster the reconciliatory dispositions.81
CONCLUSION
A certain form of retributivism, then, in the sense of a set of stable and effective criteria 
defining the fittingness of penalties by reference to a particular offence by a particular 
offender, makes most sense within the cosmology, or moral economy, in which state 
penalties are enacted within, and widely regarded as integral to, a political system rooted in 
a symbolically legitimated status hierarchy. Moreover the legitimation of those penalties 
may be underpinned in some important ways by theological symbolism and various forms of 
religious doctrine and belief. Early modern punishments look to us crude and extreme 
expressions of revenge; but their meaning to contemporaries – notably to the spectators at 
the scaffold or to the consumers of the forms of popular culture mentioned earlier – was 
importantly premised on an afterlife, on expiation, on a symbolism of penitence. And they 
resonated with moral sensibilities in a less violence-averse and a more overtly status-based 
hierarchical world than ours. But in our social and political world – a world no longer 
organised around a moral order structured in terms of symbolically anchored notions of 
desert or appropriateness – there is no agreed mechanism for anchoring the penalty scale 
according to cardinal proportionality, and actual penalty scales are driven by convention, 
calculations of consequences, and political dynamics. Particularly under conditions of a 
highly politicised climate for criminal justice policy-making, the commitment to just deserts 
all too easily produces insatiable demands for hard treatment. Desert theorists believed that 
retributivism could provide a limit to punishment by restricting its moral justification to the 
past-oriented criterion of proportionality with the seriousness of an offence. That its 
credentials on the first criterion are dismal is not surprising given that our prevailing culture 
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is no longer premised on widely shared belief in a moral order structured around notions of 
desert or appropriateness grounded in widely shared symbols of equivalence.82
But this sobering analytic conclusion should not, in our view, be interpreted as a counsel of 
despair. Few proponents of the justice model would want to recreate the hierarchical and 
authoritarian conditions which made retributive punishments such as the lex talionis 
meaningful to contemporaries, and religious affiliations and symbols of the sacred cannot be 
organised in democratic societies by processes of deliberate institutional reform, even 
should they seem attractive. The task, rather, is to consider what early modern societies can 
tell us about the links between the legitimation of punishment and broader social conditions; 
to reflect on the theoretical and practical resources which resonate with modern moral and 
political discourse; and to ponder how best they may be institutionalised under particular 
conditions.
Both moral commonality and the sense of a real relationship between victim and offender as 
fellow members of a society have doubtless been attenuated by the increasing heterogeneity 
and moral pluralisation of social orders, especially in the more individualistic, competitive, 
liberal market countries. Those countries in which the retributive revival appears to have had 
the most baleful effect in eroding the institutional counterpart to reconciliatory dispositions 
in the criminal process are those in which inequality, conflict and heterogeneity are 
highest.83 Conversely, scholarship on punishment in the Nordic countries associates their 
penal moderation with their relative homogeneity84, their relatively small size and hence 
sense of social interdependence, solidarity, and trust, their consensus-oriented political 
systems, and their relative levels of equality – all factors which foster conditions for the 
institutional counterpart of forgivingness85 and enhance expected Associational Value. The 
lesson for the more punitive – and less equal – liberal market countries is that avoiding 
polarisation and reducing inequality is likely to be as important as the effort to reconstruct 
the criminal process to effectively foster repentance and reconciliation; and that the key to 
penal moderation lies not only in reintegrative criminal justice policy, but in social policy 
and in political arrangements and institutional structures which maximise expected 
Associational Value among citizens.
In conclusion, it is important to clarify that our argument about the incapacity of the 
neoclassical revival to generate a robust sense of limits on punishment is not to be taken as 
suggesting that consequentialist theories of punishment are immune from analogous 
difficulties, let alone to make a case for penal consequentialism. (In fact, one of us is 
inclined to take a restricted consequentialist line on punishment,86 but that argument is for 
another day.) Even leaving aside the well known distributive difficulties with purely 
consequentialist arguments for punishment,87 it will be evident that while many of the 
potentially positive consequences of punishment – deterrence, incapacitation, reform and so 
on – are in principle measurable with the increasingly sophisticated tools of the social 
sciences, the question of how much of any of them adequately balances the infliction of a 
particular penalty remains an intractable moral question which cannot be reduced to any 
calculus, and one, moreover, on which views differ widely. In the realpolitik of penal 
practice, the key aspiration must be to determine the ethically optimal penal practices 
consistent with political legitimation. For modern consequentialists, as for modern 
Lacey and Pickard Page 17
Mod Law Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 September 01.
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
 Europe PM
C Funders A
uthor M
anuscripts
retributivists, there is little alternative to the messy business of building political and social 
coalitions around agreed conventions specifying, and limiting, adequate penalties. Hence our 
knowledge, from comparative research, that the countries which have most successfully 
resisted the drift to penal severity since the 1970s are those whose social, economic and 
political institutions have given them maximum capacity to coordinate policy, in the public 
interest, over the long term is of key ethical significance.88
The value pluralism and heterogeneity of modern societies, sitting alongside our 
commitment to democratic politics, complicates the tasks of both legitimising punishment 
and institutionalising arrangements favourable to reconciliation within a stable set of 
symbols and practical arrangements. The task has been yet further complicated by the spread 
of criminal law into ever greater areas of regulation. The social task of legitimising and 
civilising punishment cannot be separated from that of legitimising and civilising the 
deployment of criminal law, and while our focus in this paper has been on punishment, we 
accept that, parallel to the argument which we have made about the institutional conditions 
under which appeals to penal proportionality can be made meaningful, we need to come to 
some understanding of the conditions for building support around institutions capable of 
delivering social coordination on criteria of fittingness or proportionality relevant to 
criminalisation. But whether we are focusing on punishment or on criminalisation, we 
should train our attention on the analysis and conditions of existence of institutions 
stabilising and implementing substantive criteria of fittingness, rather than placing our 
reformist faith in the chimera of appeals to proportionality.
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